Energy Snapshot — 25/03/2026
TTF Gas Price
€46.5
per MWh
7-day avg: €45.8 | 30-day high: €48.2
EU Gas Storage
58.4%
Fill level (EU avg)
Withdrawal rate: -0.24% / day
Renewables Share
47.1%
Final energy consumption
Wind: 22% | Solar 11% | Hydro: 14%
LNG Capacity
160
bcm/year
Utilization: 68% | 12 ships en route
Live Energy Data Active — Integrates AGSI (gas storage), ENTSOG (gas network), ENTSOE (electricity grid), Eurostat APIs. Real-time conflict impact analysis.
Supply Risk Signals
Winter buffer risk
UNKNOWNRating unconfirmed — no storage data available
Price shock risk
UNKNOWNRating unconfirmed — no TTF data available
LNG bottleneck risk
UNKNOWNRating unconfirmed — no LNG capacity data available
EU Production Mix
Current EU generation mix estimate · dataset update pending
Top Contributors & Details
Germany
Live renewables profileWind + solar leader
▸ Wind: ~140 TWh/yr
▸ Solar: ~60 TWh/yr
▸ Hydro: ~25 TWh/yr
↗ +8.2% YoY growth
Spain
Live renewables profileWind + solar generation hub
▸ Wind: ~65 TWh/yr
▸ Solar: ~35 TWh/yr
▸ Hydro: ~35 TWh/yr
↗ +12.5% YoY growth
Sweden
Live renewables profileHydro + wind backbone
▸ Wind: ~30 TWh/yr
▸ Solar: ~20 TWh/yr
▸ Hydro: ~25 TWh/yr
↗ +6.8% YoY growth
Top Contributors & Details
France
IAEA / fleet dataLargest nuclear fleet in EU
▸ Key plants: Gravelines (5.7 GW), Paluel (5.3 GW), Cattenom (5.2 GW)
▸ Output: ~380 TWh/yr
→ Fleet maintenance ongoing
Sweden
IAEA / fleet dataHigh nuclear share
▸ Key plants: Ringhals (2.2 GW), Forsmark (3.3 GW)
▸ Output: ~50 TWh/yr
→ Stable operation
Finland
IAEA / fleet dataOlkiluoto 3 uplift
▸ Key plants: Multiple reactors
▸ Output: ~30 TWh/yr
→ Stable operation
Top Contributors & Details
Poland
Eurostat baselineCoal-heavy generation mix
▸ Output: ~110 TWh/yr
▸ Type: Hard coal (domestic mines)
↘ -12% YoY (EU phaseout)
Germany
Eurostat baselineResidual lignite + coal burn
▸ Output: ~85 TWh/yr
▸ Type: Lignite (phasing out)
↘ -28% YoY (EU phaseout)
Czechia
Regional system baselineCoal still material in mix
▸ Output: ~35 TWh/yr
▸ Type: Mixed coal sources
↘ -20% YoY (EU phaseout)
Top Contributors & Details
Italy
Gas system profileGas-heavy balancing generation
▸ Generation: ~120 TWh/yr
▸ Import sources: Algeria (TAP), LNG terminals
↘ -15% YoY (coal/Russian pivot)
Netherlands
Gas system profileGas-fired flexibility and hub role
▸ Generation: ~55 TWh/yr
▸ Import sources: Norway, Gate LNG
↘ -12% YoY (coal/Russian pivot)
Belgium
Market balance profileGas backup for tight margins
▸ Generation: ~40 TWh/yr
▸ Import sources: Pipeline + LNG mix
↘ -12% YoY (coal/Russian pivot)
Top Contributors & Details
Greece
Regional baselineIsland and backup generation use
Italy
Regional baselinePeaking / backup contribution
Spain
Regional baselineResidual balancing contribution
Top Contributors & Details
Finland
Eurostat baselineBiomass and CHP contribution
Sweden
Eurostat baselineBiomass / waste contribution
Denmark
Eurostat baselineBiomass and district-energy role
EU Natural Gas Reserves & Storage
MAR 2026 EST.AGSI · Live data
EU Average
—
Highest
—
Lowest
—
Sources: GIE AGSI+, European Commission, Reuters March 2026
Risk, Exposure & Predictive Watch
One consolidated view of chokepoints, highest energy-sensitive conflicts, and forward-looking shock indicators.
Supply Risk Matrix
Hormuz / Red Sea disruptions, insurance spikes, diversions, port delays.
Watch
Watch: tanker diversions, missile/drone incidents, maritime advisories.
Export outages, OPEC+ posture, sanctions tightening, force majeure headlines.
Watch
Watch: export bans, pipeline outages, quota shifts, enforcement actions.
Terminal utilization, reroutes, competition with Asia, regas bottlenecks.
Watch
EU LNG buffer: —. Watch congestion + spot premiums.
Gas burn sensitivity rises when hydro/wind underperform; nuclear outages amplify tightness.
Watch
Gas share in EU production mix: 15.7% (structural sensitivity).
Conflict-Driven Exposure
Hormuz blockade risk; Brent crude above $120; global shipping insurance tripled; EU gas +40%. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for 20% of global oil and 25% of global LNG.
EU energy independence largely achieved; Russian sanctions evasion; prices remain elevated. Expiry of transit links forces Central Europe to rely on reverse flows.
Semiconductor supply risk; TSMC produces 90% of advanced chips. A blockade would sever tech supply chains and trigger shipping and LNG volatility across Asia.
Energy Shock Watch
Shipping Lane Risk
- •Hormuz/Red Sea: 25% of global LNG passes here.
- •Insurance Premiums: Early warning for supply-chain rerouting.
- •Cape of Good Hope: Diversions add 10-14 days to transit.
Infrastructure Sabotage Risk
- •Pipeline Vulnerability: Subsea and terminal infrastructure remains fragile.
- •Grid Stress: Cyberattacks or peak winter demand can localize blackouts.
- •LNG Terminals: Newly expanded FSRU security remains critical.
Second-Order Impacts
- •Industrial Curtailment: High gas prices squeeze energy-intensive sectors.
- •Food Security: Fertilizer production cuts feed directly into prices.
- •Logistics Inflation: Diesel and bunker fuel costs cascade into consumer goods.
Conflict → Energy → Human Impact Chain
1. Trigger Layer
- •Chokepoints (Hormuz/Red Sea) and pipeline/terminal strikes are the fastest shock triggers.
- •Sanctions tightening + enforcement headlines move expectations before physical shortages.
- •Current top exposure: Iran War (score 88).
2. Transmission Layer
- •TTF: unavailable (use storage + conflict triggers as early warning).
- •EU storage: unavailable (prioritize country-level buffers).
- •LNG capacity: ~160 bcm/year (reference · 2025).
3. Real-Economy Layer
- •Household bills rise fast; transport + food inflation follow (diesel + fertilizer pass-through).
- •Industry curtailment risk (chemicals, metals, ceramics) becomes jobs + competitiveness pressure.
- •EU levers: storage mandates + joint procurement; demand response; targeted industrial support; sanctions design.
Live Energy-Linked Conflict Headlines
—Targets Progress Tracker
Major Gas Pipeline Corridors
| Corridor | Route | Capacity | Status |
|---|
Key LNG Import Terminals
| Terminal | Country | Capacity | Status |
|---|
Total EU LNG capacity: ~160 bcm/year (2025)
Country Energy Profiles
Country system posture, import exposure, storage context, and transition direction.
Germany
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Wind-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
0% — nuclear phaseout completed April 2023
Renewables
~53% (2024)
Import dependency
~95% of gas imported; ~100% of oil imported
Vulnerability
High gas import dependence (was ~55% Russian pre-2022)
Policy direction
Nuclear phaseout completed 2023; accelerating renewables + LNG terminals
France
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Nuclear-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~65-70% of electricity; 56 reactors
Renewables
~24% (2024)
Import dependency
Fully import-dependent for fuel; low carbon generation reduces fossil needs
Vulnerability
Nuclear fleet aging; maintenance outages create tight margins
Policy direction
Extending nuclear + new EPR builds; offshore wind expansion
Belgium
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Nuclear-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~45% of electricity; 2 reactors extended to 2035
Renewables
~18% (2024)
Import dependency
100% import-dependent for primary fuels
Vulnerability
High gas price exposure; nuclear extension debate; LNG terminal reliance
Policy direction
Gas storage ~—%; nuclear lifetime extension + gas backup
Netherlands
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Gas-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
Minimal (1 reactor); planning new builds
Renewables
~16% (2024)
Import dependency
Major LNG hub; Groningen field closed 2023
Vulnerability
Gas transit hub = exposure to supply shocks
Policy direction
Offshore wind scale-up; 2 new nuclear reactors planned
Poland
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Coal-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
0% (first nuclear plant under construction)
Renewables
~20% (2024)
Import dependency
Coal phaseout under EU pressure; first US LNG deal 2025
Vulnerability
Coal-heavy = high carbon costs; gas import diversification ongoing
Policy direction
Coal phaseout under EU pressure; first nuclear plant ~2033; wind + solar acceleration
Italy
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Gas-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
0% (post-referendum)
Renewables
~40% (2024)
Import dependency
~90% gas imported; Algeria + LNG terminals
Vulnerability
High gas burn for electricity; price-sensitive
Policy direction
Renewable scale-up; gas diversification via TAP pipeline + LNG
Spain
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Wind-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~20% of electricity; 7 reactors
Renewables
~50% (2024)
Import dependency
LNG imports (Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar)
Vulnerability
Iberian exception = gas price cap (2022-2023)
Policy direction
Renewable leader; hydrogen ambitions; nuclear extension debate
Austria
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Hydro-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
0% (constitutional ban)
Renewables
~80% (2024)
Import dependency
Gas import-dependent (was ~80% Russian)
Vulnerability
High Russian gas dependence pre-2022; storage buffer critical
Policy direction
Hydro + wind; gas diversification via LNG + pipeline reroutes
Denmark
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Wind-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
0%
Renewables
~80% (2024)
Import dependency
North Sea gas producer; wind export leader
Vulnerability
Low (net energy exporter)
Policy direction
100% renewable target by 2030; offshore wind expansion
Hungary
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Nuclear-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~45% of electricity; Paks plant expansion (Russian-built)
Renewables
~14% (2024)
Import dependency
~85% gas from Russia; oil pipeline dependence
Vulnerability
Highest Russian energy dependence in EU
Policy direction
Paks II nuclear expansion (Rosatom); solar growth
Sweden
Storage / buffer
—
System posture
Hydro-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~30% of electricity; 6 reactors
Renewables
~60% (2024)
Import dependency
Low (net exporter)
Vulnerability
Electricity price zones = north-south tension
Policy direction
Reversed nuclear phaseout; new builds planned; wind expansion
Finland
No underground storage — LNG terminal buffer
Storage / buffer
LNG-backed
System posture
Nuclear-led
Primary sources
Nuclear
~40% (Olkiluoto 3 online 2023)
Renewables
~45% (2024)
Import dependency
Cut Russian gas 2022; LNG terminal operational
Vulnerability
Reduced after Olkiluoto 3 + LNG diversification
Policy direction
Nuclear + renewables; energy independence from Russia achieved